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Issue
Has Barclay failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
aggregate, unified sentence of 25 years, with 18 years fixed, upon Barclay’s guilty pleas to
burglary, felony failure to notify of death, and felony destruction of evidence?

Barclay Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
On August 18, 2016, Rinda Mitchell filed a missing person report for her brother, Mark
Irwin. (PSI, pp.4, 213. 1) Ms. Mitchell and her family had not heard from Mark for over two
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Barclay 45725 &
45726 psi.pdf
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weeks. (PSI, pp.4, 213.) Ms. Mitchell went to Mark’s residence to check on him and found
Mark’s “mail piled up, his air conditioner running, the microwave door open, [and] bedding
missing from his bed.” (PSI, pp.4, 213-15) She also noted his 1985 Toyota van was missing.
(PSI, pp.4, 213, 215.) Ms. Mitchell told police she knew Mark had been spending time with
Francis “Francie” March but, when contacted, Francie told Ms. Mitchell and her family that “she
had not seen Mark either.” (PSI, pp.4, 213-14; see also PSI, p.215 (Francie called Ms. Mitchell
on August 20, 2016, and told her “she had not seen Mark for a while and was concerned” and
gave Ms. Mitchell “a lot of detailed information about Mark and the last time she was him.”).)
Police began an investigation and obtained a warrant to search Mark’s house. (PSI, pp.4,
214-18.) While officers were conducting the search, they learned that Francie and Anthony
Barclay were at a pawn shop trying to pawn a 22 caliber gun that belonged to Mark. (PSI, pp.4,
218, 220.) When police attempted to conduct a traffic stop on Francie’s vehicle, Francie and
Barclay attempted to evade them but were eventually apprehended. (PSI, pp.4, 218.) During
their police interviews, Francie and Barclay both admitted to having broken into Mark’s house
“several times” and to having stolen items and pawning them. (PSI, pp.219-20.) Francie and
Barclay gave different accounts about the last time they saw Mark and, when questioned about
Mark’s disappearance, both individuals declined to answer any further questions and requested
an attorney. (PSI, pp.219-20.)
On August 26, 2016, a Boise County Deputy reported seeing a van that matched the
description of the van owned by Mark. (PSI, pp.5, 221.) Officers responded to the area and,
upon approaching the van, “smell[ed] a very strong odor.” (PSI, p.222.) Officers opened the
sliding door of the van and discovered inside of it a decomposing body that was covered with a
tarp. (PSI, pp.222-23.) After obtaining a warrant, officers examined the contents of the van
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more closely and discovered the “body and tarp were strapped to [a] yellow kid[’]s slide, kind of
like a backboard would be used to move a medical patient.” (PSI, p.223.) The body “was in an
extensive state of decomposition” and was “face down on the slide and inside the tarp.” (PSI,
pp.223-24.) “The head was wrapped in a bed sheet,” over which “were two plastic grocery bags
that were tightly taped around the neck area with clear packing style tape.” (PSI, p.224.) “The
hands were bound behind the back with a red patterned rope”; “a loose fitting red patterned rope
was around the neck area underneath the other layers”; and the “knees were bound together with
a belt and the ankles were bound with a bungie cord.” (PSI, p.224.) “Due to the extent of
decomposition, the decedent’s identification had to be made by dental records.” (PSI, p.224.)
Those records confirmed the decedent was Mark Irwin. (PSI, p.4.) Subsequent investigation
resulted in a determination that Francie and/or Barclay were responsible for Mark’s death and
that both of them had attempted to dispose of his body. (PSI, pp.4, 224-33.)
The state charged Barclay in case 45725 with three counts of burglary, three counts of
grand theft, and one petit theft. (R., pp.48-50.) The state also charged Barclay in case 45726
with felony failure to notify of a death, felony destruction of evidence, and felony conspiracy to
commit destruction of evidence. (R., pp.216-18.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barclay pled
guilty to one count of burglary in case 45725 and to felony failure to notify of a death and felony
destruction of evidence in case 45726, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.6473, 231-40.) The district court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years, with three years
fixed, for burglary, 10 years fixed for felony failure to notify of death, and five years fixed for
felony destruction of evidence. (R., pp.79-82, 248-51.) Barclay filed a notice of appeal timely
from the judgment of conviction in each case. (R., pp.85-87, 252-54.)
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Barclay asserts his aggregate unified sentence of 25 years, with 18 years fixed, is
excessive in light of “his young age, minimal criminal record, serious mental health and
substance abuse issues, family support, and remorse for the crime.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.)
The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
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The maximum prison sentence for burglary is 10 years; the maximum prison sentence for
felony failure to notify of death is 10 years; and the maximum prison sentence for felony
destruction of evidence is five years. I.C. §§ 18-1403, -2603, 19-4301A(3). The district court
imposed consecutive, unified sentences of 10 years, with three years fixed, for burglary, 10 years
fixed for felony failure to notify of death, and five years fixed for felony destruction of evidence,
all of which fall within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.79-82, 248-51.) Barclay’s age, minimal
criminal record, mental health issues, substance abuse issues, family support, and purported
remorse do not demonstrate that his sentences are excessive, particularly in light of the serious
nature of the offenses and the danger Barclay presents to the community.
Although Barclay was not charged with the murder of Mark Irwin, he ultimately admitted
that he knew Francie had killed Mark, and that he and Francie went to great lengths to attempt to
dispose of Mark’s body. (PSI, pp.7-8.) He also admitted that, after Francie murdered Mark, he
and Francie broke into Mark’s home on multiple occasions and stole numerous items with the
intent of pawing those items. (PSI, p.8.) In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court
articulated the sentencing factors it must consider, placing paramount importance on the need to
protect society. (12/14/17 Tr., p.68, L.14 – p.69, L.22.) The court specifically considered
Barclay’s young age and his prior criminal record (12/14/17 Tr., p.70, Ls.2-9, p.71, L.22 – p.72,
L.1, p.72, L.16 – p.73, L.), which the record shows includes eight juvenile adjudications for drug
and theft-related charges and adult misdemeanor convictions for providing false information to
an officer, possessing a controlled substance and possessing drug paraphernalia (PSI, pp.9-12).
The court also considered Barclay’s “very serious substance abuse problem” and prior treatment
attempts, ultimately concluding that Barclay “has a substance abuse problem that contributes to
the risk he presents to the community.” (12/14/17 Tr., p.72, Ls.1-15.) The court specifically
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found both Barclay’s young age and the nature of his relationship with Francie March mitigating,
noting that Francie may “have had some kind of power over him that caused him to behave in
certain ways that perhaps he may not have done had he never encountered her.” (12/14/17 Tr.,
p.72, L.16 – p.73, L.22.) What was “very significant” to the court, however, was the “very
disturbing, heartless nature” of Barclay’s crimes because, by his own admission, “even assuming
he had not role in Mr. Irwin’s death himself,” Barclay “set out on a course of action that was
designed to avoid law enforcement, of course, Mr. Irwin’s family, from ever knowing what had
become of Mr. Irwin,” and “he did so in a way that facilitated the desecration of Mr. Irwin’s
body.” (12/14/17 Tr., p.73, L.23 – p.74, L.12.)
Barclay argues on appeal that the district court failed to adequately consider factors he
believes are mitigating, but a review of the record and the court’s reasoning shows the district
court thoroughly considered all of the information before it and reasonably determined that a
lengthy sentence was necessary both to protect society and to punish Barclay for the heinous and
callous nature of his crimes. (See generally 12/14/17 Tr., p.68, L.14 – p.76, L.8.) Contrary to
Barclay’s assertions, the district court did not impose “the maximum sentence for each offense.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) In fact, the court rejected the state’s recommendation for the maximum
fixed sentence and imposed a sentence that would protect society for a substantial period of time
but at the same time give Barclay an opportunity to be released on parole supervision after 18
years. (12/14/17 Tr., p.76, Ls.9-25.)
Barclay’s sentences are appropriate in light of the seriousness of his offenses, his criminal
behavior, and the danger he poses to the community. At the sentencing hearing, the district court
articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for
imposing Barclay’s sentence. (12/14/17 Tr., p.68, L.14 – p.76, L.8.) The state submits that
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Barclay has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the
attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Barclay’s convictions and sentences.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of July, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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regard for human life, I don't think that that's
true. I think that that's a dim view of
Mr. Barclay. If Anthony had no regard for human
life, he wouldn't have plead guilty and taken
responsibility, which he had the oppo1tunity to do
after he sobered up and started thinking clearly
again.
At the time I think it's fair to say he
wasn't demonstrating much regard. But to say that
Anthony, as he sits here today, has no regard for
human life, I don't think is accurate. He expects
to be punished. He expects to be held accountable
for what he did.
At his young age, I don't think he is a
lost cause, though. Anthony also has some mental
health issues that he needs to deal with. Part of
I think his awakening in the jail is that he began
receiving treatment and taking medication, and so
he is thinking a little clearly.
And when it comes down to it, I know
the factors the court has to consider. 25 years
Iixed is just pure retribution. I don't think
that it's a valid argument to say that he is a
threat to society. There is no evidence to
suggest that Anthony is actively engaged when he
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1 is under the influence of seeking out to hwt
2 people.
3
Granted, his choices were disrespectful
4 to the nth degree. J'm not sure Anthony is
5 dangerous from that standpoint, but he certainly
6 makes cataclysmically poor choices when he is
7 under the influence.
8
So sort of coming back full circle, I
9 think the state's characterization of Anthony's
10 upbringing about what to do with him sort of rings
11 true in the fact that his behavior here when -12 after he got involved with Ms. March, seems to be
13 a bit of out of character for him, at least based
14 on his upbringing. And when Anthony and I had
15 discussed what was likely to happen today, I said
16 that is going to sort of cut both ways.
17
Because on one hand, if it is so out of
18 character, it doesn't speak well for the choices
19 that he made when he had the advantages that most
20 of my clients don't have growing up. T he flip
21 side is that he can be rehabilitated. If it is
22 out of character for Anthony, then there's hope
23 for rehabilitation, and that's what we would ask
24 the court to focus on in fashioning a sentence.
25
Anthony understands that there's no
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1 excuse for his behavior. He has said over and
2 over again that he is willing to accept whatever

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

punishment the court decides to meet out. I would
ask that when the court meets out its punishment,
it considers other factors other than just pure
retribution and vengeance.
I acknowledge that there's a portion of
that that the court needs to consider. But
Anthony is a young man with a future. Bright or
not bright, that's really up to Anthony to decide.
At some point even with 25 years, Anthony is going
to be out on the streets again. And so l would
ask the court to fashion a sentence which gives
Anthony the hope of turning his life around and
gives him some incentive to behave well.
His behavior in the jail has been
largely positive. He is working on trying to make
himself better. 1 think the presentence materials
sort of suggest that he is working hard to try to
do what he can even though in the jail that is
sort of limited.
I don't have a specific recommendation
for the court, Judge, because frankly this is so
24 far outside, I wouldn't know what to do.
25
I j ust know that Anthony is not a lost

Pag e 68

1 sole, and I would ask the court to consider that.
2 TI1ank you.
3
THE COURT: TI1ank you, Mr. Lorello.
4
Mr. Barclay, would you like to make a
5 statement today?
6
THE DEFENDANT: r would, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: Go ahead.
8
THE DEFENDANT: I would like to apologize to
9 the friends and family of Mark Irwin for the pain
10 and disrespect that I have caused. There is
11 nothing that I can say or do, but I pray that God
12 will use his love to soften the pain and sorrow
13 that each ofus holds in his hearts. Thank you.
14
THE COURT: All right. TI1ank you,
15 Mr. Barclay. I appreciate your comments. I have,
16 of course, reviewed the presentence investigation
17 in this case. It's very voluminous as the parties
18 are aware.
19
I am also well aware of the four
20 objectives of criminal sentencing that Idaho law
21 directs me to consider in every case. The first
22 and foremost of those factors is protection of the
23 community. And given all that has gone on in
24 connection with this case, there is certainly
25 reason for that to be an important factor for the
12 (Pages 65 to 68)
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court's consideration in this case.
Protection of the community factor is
in some sense another way of saying
incapacitation, providing a period of time where
society is free from the risks that a particular
defendant might present to the community.
And, of course, as l said, the conduct,
the behavior in this case, indicates that there is
risk to the community the defendant presents.
The other three factors: deterrence,
rehabilitation, and punishment. There is an
important role for punishment to play here in
fashioning a sentence as well. These are very
serious wrongs indeed, grave level of disrespect
for human life, not limited to Mr. Irwin but
extending to the members of his family who, of
course, were wondering where he was, not knowing
where he was, and Mr. Barclay sets out on a course
of action that is designed to deprive them of ever
having that knowledge, and that he is doing that
to serve his own ends, perhaps Ms. March's ends,
in some combination.
But there is a punishment to be meated
out for that very wrong, heartless kind of action.
Rehabilitation I think serves, plays some role in
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the sentence that I have to hand down today as
well. The defendant, as I've noted, is 20 years
old. The three charges considered together, with
consecutive sentences being imposed on each of
them, would allow me to ordered the defendant's
imprisonment for a period of 25 years. That makes
him more or less 45 years old if l were to give
him the absolute maximum, as the state has asked
me to do today.
So the defendant will be released into
society again at some point unless he doesn't -lives an abnormally short life. So I do think
that there is some need to consider the point I
raised with Mr. Bleazard. The defendant is going
to be released at some point absent an untimely
death while incarcerated.
ls society better off or not better off
if he has, upon release a period oftime should
the parole board see fit to parole him, if I
provide an indeterminate portion of his sentence
here where there will be someone with an eye on
him, someone designed to try to help him
re-integrate into the community, and might that
not be a more public safety oriented approach to a
sentence in this case than one which says hold him
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as long as the law allows, the Department of
Correction, and then release him free of any
burden to report to a parole officer;
To be supervised in any fashion despite
that he'll then be a middle-aged man, not someone
who is on his last legs, nearing the grave,
because of advanced old age, but someone who will
be, as I said, in his mid-40s and will have had 25
years of time in prison out of normal society with
no adjustment period and no organized sort of
support system provided by the Department of
Correction.
So it is a weighing, as Mr. Bleazard
suggested, but that's part of what I take into
account in looking at the rehabilitation angle to
this sentence. So those are the factors that seem
to be important here. It's important to consider,
of course, the circumstances of this -- of these
pa11icular crimes; also, what got the defendant to
this point in his life, his prior record, his
circumstances.
Now, the defendant did have a
significant juvenile criminal history leading up
to this, including a history of burglaries, had
some adult criminal history that predates these

Page 72
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

offenses as well. The defendant seemed to
struggle in school, didn't finish school; had a
very serious substance abuse problem, a long
history of using methamphetamine and marijuana;
had done inpatient treatment as a juvenile and
indicated in the presentence investigation that he
stayed clean for several years prior to this
incident.
Of course, Mr. Lorello has argued today
that this was a highly substance abuse adult
period of time for the defendant in which he
committed these crimes.
So the defendant certainly has a
substance abuse problem that contributes to the
risk he presents to the community as well.
Now, you can look at certain mitigating
factors in the case, and, of course, I am directed
to consider all mitigating factors that are
presented to me. A couple that seem to have some
significance here and that has been touched on to
varying degrees in argument is the defendant's
age. He is very young, very young at the time of
the alleged crimes.
Social science seems to suggest at this
point that a 19-year-old man is not a fully formed
13 (Pages 69 to 72 )
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1 person with a fully formed brain at this point.
2 We don't know, I suppose, on some level what kind
3 of, with additional development of his brain,
4 where Mr. Barclay will wind up. So that maybe
5 taken in some mitigation that this is a person who
6 is still becoming fully formed, and ultimately
7 when later in life may be better equipped to make
8 less terrible decisions than he has made so far in
9 his life.
10
Additionally, there is the relationship
11 element between the defendant and Ms. March, who
12 is I believe a little bit more than twice his age.
13 There is some reason to think, although the state
14 has presented arguments as to why that is not the
15 case, that Ms. March had some, certainly some,
16 influence on the defendant's behavior and his role
1 7 in these offenses.
18
His decision-making may potentially
19 have had some kind of power over him that caused
20 him to behave in certain ways that perhaps he may
21 not have done had he never encountered her. So
22 those are items that I can consider in mitigation.
23
What is very significant to me, of
24 course, and I've touched on it already, is the
25 very disturbing, heartless nature of these crimes

1 themselves. The defendant, as I said and counsel
2 have argued, even assuming he had no role in
3 Mr. Irwin's death himself, set out on a course of
4 action that was designed to avoid law enforcement,
5 of course, Mr. Irwin's family, from ever knowing
6 what had become of Mr. Irwin.
7
And he did so in a way that facilitated
8 the desecration of Mr. Irwin's body. I can only
9 imagine the level of distress and heartache caused
10 to Mr. Irwin's family, and the defendant will have
11 to wrecken over the rest of his life with his role
12 in that, and that's a terribly hard thing.
13
A person who could allow himself to
14 behave in that way is someone who at least at
15 present does in my mind present as a danger of the
16 community. There is no way of kind of
1 7 rationalizing this behavior this extreme as some
18 sort of one off, that a person who would do
19 something like this could be somebody that 1 could
20 nevertheless view as completely risk free, and
21 somebody that could be -- that there is no need
22 for concern about.
23
I know that that's not exactly what
24 Mr. Lorello is suggesting, but there is I think a
25 significant safety related concern with regard to
Page 76
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1 the defendant.
2
Now, I'm not going to engage in any
3 kind of presumption about whether Mr. Barclay
4 participated in Mr. Irwin's death himself. As
5 Mr. Lorello points out, this isn't a murder
6 sentencing. There isn't a murder charge. The
7 state could, had it chosen to bring such a charge,
8 bring one and have it adjudicated. So I'm not
9 going to assume that Mr. Barclay was, is someone
10 who has committed murder.
11
There is, of course, though,
12 significant indication that the defendant,
13 Mr. Barclay, knew full well what had happened,
14 that the defendant -- there is certainly
15 indications that the defendant was at least
16 present for some or all of those events, and,
1 7 again, did nothing.
18
And that is a grave matter even
19 assuming that he had no involvement in the murder
20 itself or in its planning or even any advance
21 knowledge of what was going to happen. The state
22 has argued that he did have that advance
2 3 knowledge.
24
It seems to me a significance sentence
25 is warranted in this case. lt is warranted as a

1 punishment. It is warranted as a means of
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ensuring that society is safe from the defendant
for a period of time. It is warranted to give the
defendant a substantial period oftime to
reconsider how he is going to live his life and to
position himself to make the most of the rest of
it when he is next permitted to be released in the
community.
As I have alluded to before during the
hearing today, 1 question the wisdom of a flat out
25-year fixed prison term, because it seems to me
that some oversight would be in society's general
best interest when the defendant is released. And
the one way I can ensure that there will be no
oversight is to give the defendant 25 years fixed.
Now, I could give him something less
than 25 years fixed, and the Department of
Correction, the parole board, may choose to hold
him for 25 years if they think that he can't be
safely released and they want to hold him as long
as they possibly can. That's how our system
works. I set the maximum time they can hold him.
Tset the minimum time they must hold him. What
they do in between is up to the parole board, and
that seems to me to be the best, safest way to
14 (Pages 73 to 76)
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